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JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Rules 3
and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff is appealing

from the Third Judicial District Court's entry of Judgment in favor
of Defendant on Defendant's affirmative defense of accord
satisfaction.

and

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding an
accord

and

satisfaction

when

all credible

evidence

and

trial

testimony supports such a determination.
Whether
attorney's

Respondent

fees

is entitled

incurred

to an award

in responding

to

this

of costs and
frivolous

and

unwarranted appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiff,

Kelly

Howard

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Plaintiff" or "Howard"), initiated the instant proceeding below
as a personal injury action against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler
(hereinafter referred to as "Defendant" or "Buhler").

On June 7

and 8, 1988, this proceeding came on regularly for trial before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court Judge, with the
right to a jury having been waived by both parties.

Both parties

proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief.
702812.mtf
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The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted and the trial
court's decision thereon taken under advisement.

The trial court

thereafter submitted its Memorandum Decision dated September 21,
1988, finding in favor of Defendant.
On October
Findings

and

14, 1988, the trial court

Entry

of

Judgment

in

favor

entered

of

its Order,

Defendant

affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.

on

his

A copy of said

Order, Findings and Entry of Judgment is attached hereto as "A" to
the addendum.

The Findings of the trial court read in pertinent

part as follows:
1.
. . . it was stipulated by counsel and
agreed by the Court that the issue of accord
and satisfaction would be considered by the
Court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue,
that it would be dispositive of all other
issues.
2. The Court on the issue of the affirmative
defense of accord and satisfaction, finds that
on July 8, 1986, Christine Kirchoff, on behalf
of Defendant's liability insurer offered
Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement
of all claims arising out of the automobile
accident at issue herein.
On or about this
same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement
figure in the amount of $8,000.00. Therefore,
the parties expressed a mutual assent or
meeting of the minds with regard to the
settlement figure and a binding accord and
satisfaction had been achieved.
Record of proceedings, at 289.
referred to as "R. at

702812.mtf
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On November 4, 1988, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from
said Judgment.
B.

Statement of Facts and Evidence Supporting Trial Court's
Judgment.
On November 9, 1985, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile

accident with Defendant, allegedly resulting in bodily injury to
Plaintiff. Following the accident, Plaintiff communicated with Ms.
Christine Kirchoff, a claims adjustor for Defendant's insurer,
American Concept Insurance Company
"American Concept").

On January

(hereinafter referred
24, 1986, Plaintiff

to as

and Ms.

Kirchoff agreed by telephone to settle all of Plaintiff's claims
arising out of the automobile accident for the sum of $2,834.00.
Transcript of proceedings, testimony of Christine L. Kirchoff, at
96-7.

(Hereinafter referred to as "Tr. at

").

Ms. Kirchoff was thereafter contacted by Plaintiff on May 20,
1986,

and

was

advised

that

Plaintiff

was

going

to

withhold

executing the Release upon which they had previously agreed. Tr.
at 97-98.
On or

about

May

29, 1986, Plaintiff

entered

into

a

Fee

Agreement with his present counsel, Robert Hansen, which provides
that Hansen would receive, "50% of excess over insurance company's
written offer to settle for a certain amount, which ever is lower
.

. . ."

702812.mtf
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8

hereto as "B" to the addendum, see also, Tr. at 58-60.

Thus,

Plaintiff was compelled under his unorthodox fee agreement with
counsel

to mislead

Defendant's

insurer

into

believing

it

was

settling the case and providing him written settlement documents.
This

fee

agreement

then

contemplated

authorizing

Plaintiff's

counsel to proceed with a legal action against Defendant in breach
of this agreement.

Tr. at 59.

On July 8, 1986, Plaintiff called Ms. Kirchoff and explained
a computer programming course which he was interested in and which
would provide him with a certificate of employability even though
he had never graduated from high school.

The cost of the course

was $3,700.00, and in analyzing the case, Ms. Kirchoff at that
point in time made Plaintiff an offer of settlement in the amount
of $8,000.00.

At that time Plaintiff agreed to settle his claims

in full with Defendant for $8,000.00, as a novation of the earlier
settlement agreement.

Tr. at 99-100, 101-105.

Ms. Kirchoff did

condition this settlement upon receipt of Plaintiff's educational
contract to justify the increased settlement figure.

Plaintiff

performed this condition by sending a copy of his contract to Ms.
Kirchoff.

Tr. at 102.

Defendant's Exhibit 17, a copy of which is

attached hereto as "C" to the addendum.
On

August

Plaintiff
702812.mtf
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1986, Ms. Kirchoff

requesting

that

he

comply
9

dispatched
with

the

a

letter

t€>rms of

to

their

settlement agreement.

The letter stated as follows:

On July 8, 1986, we made a settlement with you
for injuries sustained in the above-captioned
incident contingent upon our receiving a copy
of the school contract for your computer
training.
Defendant's Exhibit 12, a copy of which is attached hereto as "D"
to the addendum.
On or about August 8, 1986, Plaintiff sent a letter with the
education contract to Ms. Kirchoff stating:
Enclosed is the contract from the school which
I am attending (Mountainwest College).
Please send me my release form for $8,000.00
on which we agreed.
Defendant's Exhibit 14, a copy of which is attached hereto as "E"
to the addendum.
Ms. Kirchoff sent the Release from as requested, accompanied
by a memo dated August 8, 1986, in which she stated:

"Please sign

and have notarized the enclosed Release so that we may conclude
your claim."

Defendant's Exhibits 13 and 16 respectively, attached

hereto as "F" and "G" to the addendum.
Ms. Kirchoff received no reply from Plaintiff until October
13, 1986, when she received a copy of the Complaint initiating the
action below.
Plaintiff wholly misstates Ms. Kirchoff's testimony at trial
with respect to the $8,000.00 settlement.
702812.mtf
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Plaintiff claims Ms.

Kirchoff did not testify that he accepted the $8,000.00 offer, but
only that he was "ready" to settle.
transcript

indicates,

Plaintiff

had

However, as a review of the
agreed

with

Ms.

Kirchoff

respecting a settlement agreement in complete satisfaction of his
claims.

Ms. Kirchofffs testimony at trial is as follows:

Q.

Did there come a time when you had an
opportunity, you received another telephone
call from Kelly Howard concerning this mcitter
prior to—excuse me, we talked about a letter
or conversation of July 8?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why don ? t you tell the court who initiated the
call and what was discussed during the
conversation?

A.

On July 8 Kelly would have had to initiate* the
call to me since he didn't have a phone. Kelly
indicated at that point in time he felt he was
ready to settle the claim.
I said "are you
sure?
I do not wish to pressure you."
He
said, "I am ready."

Q.

Based upon the totality of the events which led
up to the filing of this lawsuit, what, if any,
understanding did you have and do you have
today as to whether or not his claim had been
concluded by both parties?

A.

I believe it was concluded.
1 offered, he
accepted.
But were there any [reservations] on his
acceptance such as "but I want to review it
with an attorney"?

Q.

A.

702812.mtf

In August of 1986, no.
I had no knowledge
there was an attorney until October 9.
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Tr. at 101, 105.
During the trial, Phyllis Buhler, Mr. Buhler's wife, testified
that during the traffic citation hearing held on or about January
23, 1986, Plaintiff was asked if he had been fully compensated for
his claims arising out of this automobile accident by Buhler's
insurer.

According to Mrs. Buhler, Plaintiff indicated that he

had settled the case with Buhler's insurance company.

Tr. at 90-

91.
In the deposition taken of Plaintiff on October 22, 1987, the
following hypothetical question was asked of Plaintiff as well as
his accompanying response:

Q.

Okay. Let me ask you sort of a hypothetical
question. If you called her [Kirchoff] up and
you said, I want to settle this case for
$8,000, and you discussed your school contract
and she said okay, send me the school contract
and I' 11 send you a release and we can conclude
your claim and you never said anything more to
her, do you think it's reasonable for her to
believe that you had settled the claim?

MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to that as calling for
a conclusion in the form that it's posed, a legal
conclusion.
Q.
(By Mr. Florence) Can you answer?
MR. HANSEN: Go ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS:

702812.mtf
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(Howard depo. tr. at 69-70).

Thus, by Plaintiff's own admission,

a reasonable person would have properly believed that Plaintiff had
settled his claim.
Nothing

in

any

of

the

correspondence

dispatched

to Ms.

Kirchoff by Plaintiff indicates that Plaintiff was not willing to
settle his claims with Ms. Kirchoff on July 8, 1986.

In fact,

Plaintiff's testimony at trial was as follows:
Q.

You never told Ms. Kirchoff you did not intend
to settle this case, did you?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Nor did you communicate to her that it was not
your intention to conclude the . . . matter?

A.

That was not my intention.

Q.

Yes, you never disclosed that to her, did you?

A.

No, I didn't.

Tr. at 50-51.
Plaintiff knew that Ms. Kirchoff was attempting to settle this
matter

with

him.

Tr.

at

47-48,

68.

Yet,

Plaintiff

never

"corrected" Ms. Kirchofffs perception of the situation and, in
fact, at trial he equivocated as to whether or not he had actually
settled, stating that he "might have settled for $8,000.00."

Tr.

at 68.
When judged by the standard of objective reasonableness, all
conduct of Plaintiff indicated that he had settled this case with
702812.mtf
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Ms. Kirchoff.

After the fact, he has asserted that it was not his

intent at the time to settle the claim, but that intent was never
communicated to Ms. Kirchoff.

Thus, under the circumstances, a

reasonable person would have understood that Plaintiff had settled
his claim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The instant appeal is simply unfounded since all credible

evidence set forth above supports the trial court's finding.

In

view of the deference to be accorded the trial court in reviewing
the evidence

and

assessing

the credibility

of

the witnesses,

Plaintiff has failed to set forth even a single legally cognizable
error of the lower court.

In an attempt to avoid the judgment

below, Plaintiff now claims that he had some unexpressed ulterior
motives

in

securing

a

settlement

agreement

with

Defendant's

insurance carrier. However, these unexpressed and improper motives
are insufficient to avoid a binding accord and satisfaction.

Under

the objective test applied under Utah law, a reasonable person
would have believed that Plaintiff had settled his claim.
2.

The meritless questions raised in the instant appeal do

not involve novel questions of first impression which would warrant
the establishment of a new burden of proof to prove accord and
satisfaction.

The degree of proof required to establish an accord

and satisfaction must be the same as that required to establish the
702812.mtf
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existence of any contract; i.e., a preponderance of the evidence.
Where, as here, there is sufficient credible evidence to support
such a finding, the trial court must be upheld.

Further, even if

a higher standard of proof were required, such a standard would be
easily satisfied by the facts in the instant case.
3.

Defendant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's

fees incurred in responding to this frivolous appeal.

Plaintiff

has not identified any alleged error on the part of the trial
court, but simply wants this Court to retry the facts of the case.
A reasonable

inquiry into applicable law and the record

below

demonstrates the patent impropriety of the instant appeal.
ARGUMENT I
THIS APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN FILED IN GOOD FAITH SINCE
ALL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Plaintiff
evidence

to

satisfaction.

improvidently

support
This

the

of Facts

trial

court's

contention

evidence established below.
Statement

argues that there

is

finding

is absolutely

of

insufficient
accord

contrary

to

and
the

From a review of nothing more than the

above, the propriety

judgment should be readily apparent.

of

the trial

court's

However, after setting forth

the appropriate standard of review, Defendant will illustrate how
the trial court's judgment is in accord with controlling Utah law
as applied to the evidence in this case.

702812.mtf
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a.

Standard of Review of Lower Court's Decision

Plaintiff is asking this Court to retry the facts of this case
rather than review the legal sufficiency of the trial courtf s
findings.

The issue on appeal is not whether there was a binding

accord and satisfaction, but whether there was sufficient evidence
for the trial judge to so find.
The trial court's finding of accord and satisfaction must be
upheld since sufficient credible evidence exists to sustain such
a finding.
the

Court

In Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P. 2d 900 (Utah 1979),
upheld

satisfaction

where

the

trial

there

support that determination.

was

court? s

finding

sufficient

.Id. at 902.

of

credible

accord
evidence

and
to

The Court declared:

After a careful review of the record, we
cannot say, in deference to the trial court's
prerogative to adjudge the credibility of
witnesses, that the court's findings are not
supported by credible evidence as to the
parties' intentions regarding the cancellation of the note.
Id.
Further, this Court is to review the evidence below in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings.

Where there

is sufficient credible evidence to support that finding, this Court
must sustain them.
48 (Utah 1982).

Search v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P.2d
Search sets forth the deference to be accorded

the trial judge's findings of fact in a non-jury trial:
702812.mtf
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As we have frequently stated, in a nonjury trial it is the trial judge's prerogative to find facts - including judging
the credibility of witnesses, weighing the
reliability of other evidence, and drawing
fairly derived and reasonable inferences
therefrom. On Appeal this Court reviews the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court findings. Where there is
competent evidence to support the findings
this Court must sustain them.
Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
It is clear from the foregoing Statement of Facts that the
overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the trial courtf s
findings and judgment.
of

overcoming

the

court's decision.

Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden

presumption

of validity

afforded

the

lower

"It is incumbent upon the appellant to marshall

all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
to

then

demonstrate

that

even when

viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable to the factual determinations made by the court, that the
evidence is insufficient to support its findings."

Harline v.

Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted).
Under the standard of review employed by this Court, Plaintiff
has failed to set forth even sufficient factual contentions to
justify this appeal.

Plaintiff has further failed to identify any

cognizable error upon which this appeal may be based, since there
is abundant evidence to support the trial court's finding and no
suggestion that the trial court abused its discretion.
702812.mtf
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b. The Trial Court's Judgment Comports
With Utah Law Respecting Accord and Satisfaction
An accord

and satisfaction arises when the parties to an

agreement or cause of action agree that a different performance,
to be made in substitution of the performance originally claimed
by the Plaintiff, will discharge the obligations stated under the
original agreement or cause of action.

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v.

Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).

As the Court set out

in Sugarhouse Finance there are four necessary elements to an
accord and satisfaction:
1.

A proper subject matter;

2.

Competent parties;

3.

An assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties; and

4.

A consideration given for the accord.

Id.
It is well recognized in Utah that the agreement to settle a
disputed

or

consideration

uncertain
for

the

cause
accord

of
and

action

constitutes

satisfaction.

valid

"Where

the

underlying claim is disputed or uncertain ('unliquidated'), the
obligorfs assent to the definite statement of performance in the
accord amounts to sufficient consideration, as it constitutes a
surrender of the right to dispute the initial obligation."
(footnote omitted).
702812.mtf
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Id.

The settlement of Plaintiff's bodily injury claim was a proper
subject matter for a contract of accord and satisfaction.

It is

common for persons injured in automobile accidents to make monetary
settlements with claims adjusters negotiating on behalf of their
insureds.

In

the

instant

case,

Plaintiff

and

Ms.

Kirchoff

negotiated and settled Plaintiff's claim as a matter of course.
Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff are both competent parties and were
so at the time of entering the settlement contract.
Both parties agreed to the essential terms of the contract,
i.e., that Plaintiff would release all claims in exchange for
$8,000.00,
sending

his

provided

he

educational

substantiate
contract.

this

increased

Plaintiff

signed

amount
a

by

letter

stating those terms and indicating that he "agreed" to the terms.
Ms. Kirchoff testified that she understood that a settlement had
likewise been reached with Plaintiff.
The standard used to determine whether a party to an accord
and satisfaction contract mutually assented to its terms is judged
by an objective standard of what a "reasonable" person would have
understood from the party's language or acts.
on this subject is clear.

The Utah case law

In Jaramillo v. Farmer's

Insurance

Group, 669 P. 2d 1231 (Utah 1983), the Court was called upon to
consider the effect of a settlement agreement reached in compromise
of a personal injury action against State Farm Insurance Company's
702812.mtf
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insured.

In finding the settlement agreement to be binding upon

the Plaintiff, the Court declared:
In light of the stipulation of the parties, it
is clear that Plaintiff outwardly accepted
State Farm's terms of settlement. Any contrary
intentions
he
may
have
had
were
left
unexpressed and were not otherwise disclosed.
It is well established in the law that
unexpressed intentions do not effect the
validity of a contract.
Id. at 1233.
In reaching the conclusions set forth above, the Court relied
upon the earlier decision, Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226,
219 P. 539 (1923), for the following proposition:
The apparent mutual assent of the parties,
essential to the formation of a contract, must
be gathered by the language employed by them,
and the law imputes to a person an intention
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his
words and acts. It judges of his intentions
by his outward expressions and excludes all
questions
in regard
to his
unexpressed
intention. If his words or acts judged by a
reasonable standard manifest an intention to
agree to the matter in question, that agreement
is established and it is immaterial what may
be the real but unexpressed state of his mind
upon the subject.
Jaramillo, 669 P.2d at 1233.
When

judged

under

a

reasonable

standard,

the

outward

expressions of Plaintiff as set forth in detail above, rather than
any unspoken intentions he now claims to have had, establishes a
binding accord and satisfaction. During the telephone conversation
702812.mtf
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on July 8,

1986, Plaintiff

and Ms. Kirchoff

agreed

to

settle

Plaintifffs bodily injury claim for $8,000.00. As execution of the
settlement agreement, Plaintiff sent his education contract as well
as a signed letter to Ms. Kirchoff which stated in part, "please
send

me

my

release

form

for

$8,000.00

on

which

we

agreed."

Therefore, based upon the objective standard, reasonable minds
would have understood that the parties had settled this dispute.
Plaintiff cites no authority in support of his proposition
that

the parties

had

not entered

an accord

and

satisfaction.

Instead, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the authorities cited
by Defendant.

Plaintiff's attempts to distinguish Sugar House

Finance Co., 610 P. 2d

1369

(Utah

1980) are

ineffectual

since

Defendant cited the Sugar House Finance case to set forth the four
necessary elements of an accord and satisfaction.

Plaintiff

likewise attempts to distinguish Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance
Group, 669 P. 2d 1231 (Utah 1983), and Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 219
P. 539 (1923).

However, those cases are cited by Defendant to

establish the proper standard under contract law for evaluating
whether

the

parties

expressed

"meeting of the minds."

the requisite

mutual

assent

or

In that regard, Plaintiff admits that an

objective standard is to be used in analyzing the issue of mutual
assent and quotes the Allen decision as follows:

"There is no

substantial conflict in the evidence, the most important part of
702812.mtf
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which consists of written communications between the parties."
Plaintiff

relies on this one sentence to claim

that here all

critical communications were oral rather than in writing. However,
a review of the above facts indicates that by Plaintiff's own
letter received August 8, 1986, he had memorialized the substance
of the settlement agreement reached with Ms. Kirchoff on July 8,
1986.
Therefore, the Allen case (and as more recently cited with
approval

in

the

Jaramillo

case) provides

clear

precedent

for

finding a binding contract of accord and satisfaction here.
i.)

Key

An Executed Release of all Claims is not Necessary
to a Finding of Accord and Satisfaction.

An accord and satisfaction need not be in writing.

Golden

Realty,

1985);

Inc.

v.

Mantas,

699

P.2d

730,

732

(Utah

Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P. 2d 900, 902 (Utah 1979).
court

will

sustain

the

trial

court's

finding

An appellate

of

accord

and

satisfaction if there is sufficient credible evidence respecting
accord and satisfaction.

Christensen 595 at 902. See also, Cheney

v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963).
In Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah
1982) a general contractor filed suit to foreclose a mechanic's
lien

on

a

ski

lodge

construction

project

and

the

defendant

subcontractor sought to enforce a previous settlement agreement

702812.mtf
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entered into with the general contractor respecting settlement of
certain claims arising out of the construction project.

The trial

court found that a valid accord and satisfaction had been entered
between the general and subcontractors.

The general contractor

appealed and the trial courtf s decision was upheld by the Utah
Supreme Court.
In upholding the earlier decision, the Court declared:
The stipulation and letter sent to National
Mechanical by their terms indicate they were
merely to memorialize a previous oral agreement
made between the parties.
That the parties
contemplated subsequent execution of a written
instrument as evidence of their agreement did
not prevent the oral agreement from binding the
parties.
... If a written agreement is
intended to memorialize an oral contract, a
subsequent failure to execute the written
document does not nullify the oral contract.
In our view the prior agreement was an
executory accord and as such constitutes a
valid enforceable contract. f An accord is an
agreement between parties, one to give up or
perform, the other to receive or accept, such
agreed payment or performance in satisfaction
of a claim. f
Browning v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060
(1937). In Alaska Creamery Products, Inc. v.
Wells, Alaska 373 P.2d 505, 511 (1962), the
court defined an executory accord as f an
agreement that an existing claim shall be
discharged in the future by the rendition of
a substituted performance.f
See also, 6
Corbin, Contracts, §1269 at 75-76 (1962)."
Id. at 384 (citations omitted).
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Therefore, as in the Lawrence decision, the receipt of the
signed Release of All Claims for $8,000 was not necessary prior to
finding a binding oral accord and satisfaction entered into by
Plaintiff and Ms. Kirchoff on July 8, 1986,

As in Lawrence, the

record here supports the conclusion that an enforceable accord and
satisfaction was reached by the parties.

Further, the accord and

satisfaction was in no way conditioned upon receipt of the executed
settlement agreement and therefore, Plaintiff's continued claims
regarding the release are both misplaced and irrelevant.
ARGUMENT II
THIS APPEAL DOES NOT PRESENT ANY NOVEL QUESTIONS
OF FIRST IMPRESSION WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS
COURT ESTABLISHING A NEW EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
TO PROVE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Despite Plaintiff's rather desperate claims to the contrary,
this

is

not

an

unusual

case

of

first

impression.

Lawrence

Construction, 642 P. 2d 382 (Utah 1982), clearly establishes the
propriety and enforceability of an oral accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 384.

Further, when viewed in the light most favorable to

the factual determinations made by the lower court, all evidence
in this case supports that court' s findings. Therefore, this Court
must uphold the trial court ? s judgment.
P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986).
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Harline v. Campbell, 728

This case certainly does not justify the announcement of a new
legal standard requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence to
establish an accord and satisfaction.

Rather, this Court is to

uphold the trial court's finding where there is sufficient credible
evidence to support that determination, Christensen v. Abbott, 595
P.2d at 902.

After a review of the above facts, and in deference

to the trial court's prerogative to adjudge the credibility of the
witnesses, it is contrary to reason for Plaintiff to claim that the
court's findings are not supported by credible evidence.
Additionally,

Plaintiff

argues

that

policy

considerations

require a heightened degree of proof to establish an accord and
satisfaction.
issue here
counsel.

However, the true public policy consideration at

involves

Plaintiff's

unorthodox

fee

agreement

witn

That agreement required Plaintiff to actively mislead

Defendant's

insurance

carrier

into

believing

that

it

was

negotiating a good faith settlement of Plaintiff's personal injury
action.

That

level of deception

in negotiating

a

settlement

agreement as well as the subsequent breach of that agreement should
be

strongly

discouraged.

"The

law

favors

the

resolution

of

controversies and uncertainties through compromise and settlement
rather than through litigation . . . . "
and Settlement

§5

(1976).

15 Am.Jur. 2d Compromise

Therefore, if any consideration of

public policy is implicated here, it requires affirmance of the
702812.mtf
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lower court's judgment

since it encourages

sincere and honest

negotiated settlements.
Plaintiff cites Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), in support of his claim for a more demanding burden of
proof.

However,

Brown

has

no

application

involving accord and satisfaction.

to

a

controversy

Brown involves a situation

where the Plaintiff remains silent during a purported settlement
conference with the defendant and counsel for both parties.

The

issue in Brown essentially involved whether counsel could enter a
binding agreement for the plaintiff with plaintiff manifesting no
assent to the terms thereof.

Here, however, Plaintiff initiated

all relevant contact with Ms. Kirchoff, agreed by telephone on July
8, 1986, to settle his claims and memorialized his intention to
settle through the letter received by Ms. Kirchoff on August 8,
1986.

Thus,

Plaintiff's

reliance upon the Brown decision

is

unfounded.
Further, Plaintiff grossly mischaracterizes Holder v. Holder,
9

Utah

2d

163, 340 P. 2d 761

Plaintiff claims, increase

(1959).

"the required

That case did
proof

not, as

from clear and

convincing to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an annulment
suit." Holder simply coalesces the previously established majority
position "that the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless
the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
702812.mtf
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Id.

at 763.

(footnote omitted).
Plaintiff's

This case, therefore, in no way

supports

claim for an increased burden of proof here.

Thus, it is readily apparent that this case does not require
a change of the legal evidentiary standards necessary to establish
a

binding

contract

satisfaction.

or,

more

particularly,

an

accord

and

Moreover, even if a higher evidentiary standard was

required, it is certain that, when viewed in the most favorable
light,

all

evidence

adduced

below

supports

the

lower

court's

findings and judgment.
ARGUMENT III
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HIS REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING
TO THE INSTANT APPEAL
As the foregoing arguments plainly illustrate, the instant
appeal is not based on any legally supportable grounds.

Plaintiff

has

means

filed

this

frivolous

proceeding

simply

as

a

of

interposing delay and in an attempt to compel a more advantageous
settlement from Defendant in order to avoid the unnecessary and
additional

expenses

incurred

in

responding

to

this

appeal.

Reasonable inquiry into the facts of record and existing legal
authority would

have clearly

indicated

instant appeal.
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the impropriety

of the

Therefore, Defendant respectfully seeks damages and single or
double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees from Plaintiff,
pursuant to Rules 33 and 40, R. Utah Ct. App.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented to the trial
court supports the finding of accord and satisfaction.

The issues

raised by Plaintiff in no way frame a proper challenge to the trial
court's judgment.

Plaintiff has not raised any supportable claim

of error below, but rather seeks to have this Court re-evaluate the
evidence and reach a different conclusion. Therefore, the judgment
of the lower court must be upheld in its entirety and the instant
appeal dismissed with damages, attorney's fees and costs awarded
to Defendant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ffiy^feay of August, 1989.

Donald J. Turser '
M. Taylor Florence
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C.
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
caused

p/vj

tj^^^flay of August, 1989, I

four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF

RESPONDENT to be served upon the following by depositing copies
thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Robert B. Hansen
838-18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

M. Taylor norence

702812.mtf

29

Tab A

M l J f j iN CLERK'S
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Donald J. Purser, 2663
M. Taylor Florence, 4835
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
A Professional Corporation
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Defendant Buhler

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KELLY HOWARD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER, FINDINGS AND
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. C86-7662
(Judge James S. Sawaya)

ROBERT E. BUHLER,
Defendant.

On

June

7,

1988, the above-referenced

parties

regularly

appeared before the Court at the trial of this matter.

Robert

B. Hansen, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, and Donald
J. Purser, Esq. and M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki &
Berrett, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

Both parties

proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief.
The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted, and the
courts decision thereon taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the evidence and arguments of
counsel, as well as the written memorandum

submitted

and all

other documents of record in this case, thereafter submitted its
memorandum decision dated September 21, 1988, finding in favor of
Defendant on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.
In support of said decision, the following findings of fact are
submitted:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This

automobile

is

a

collision

personal
on

injury

November

9,

case

resulting

1985.

The

from

an

issues

of

liability, causation and damages were presented during the trial
of this matter, as well as Defendant's affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction.

It was stipulated by counsel and agreed

by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be
considered by the court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue,
that it would be dispositive of all other issues.
2.

The Court, on the issue of the affirmative defense of

accord and satisfaction, finds that on July 8, 1986, Christine
Kirchoff,

on

behalf

of

Defendant's

liability

insurer

offered

Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement of all claims
arising out of the automobile accident at issue herein.

On or

about this same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement figure in
the amount of $8,000.00.
mutual

assent

or

meeting

Therefore, the parties expressed a
of

the

minds

with

regard

to

this

settlement figure and a binding accord and satisfaction had been
07166.mtf
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achieved•
3.
claims

The Court
arising

further finds that the settlement

out of the automobile

accident

herein

of the
is the

proper subject matter for an accord and satisfaction and that the
parties thereto were competent to enter into such an agreement.
Finally, the Court finds that there was valid consideration in
the agreement to settle a disputed, uncertain cause of action
sufficient to create a binding accord and satisfaction.
4.

The

finding

of a valid

accord

and

satisfaction

is

dispositive of this case and the Court, therefore, need not reach
the issues of liability, causation and/or damages with respect to
the personal injury claims herein.
5.

Accordingly,

it

is hereby

ordered

that

judgment

be

entered against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler, for the amount of
$8,000.00.
6.

On file with the court and dated January 15, 1988, is a

Notice of Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in the amount of $16,000.

In as much as the

judgment finally obtained by Plaintiff in this case was

07166.mtf
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significantly

less than the $16,000 heretofore

offered, costs

shall be taxed to the Plaintiff.

DATED t h i s

M_

day of

d2JZ<£*>

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

/~\

„—^

cisfk
/

Ju4ge James S. Sawaya
D i s t r i c t - C o u r t Judge

/ ^Deputy Clerk

Submitt

Donald J . iajjfeer, Esq.
M. Taylor Florence, Esq.
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C.
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
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>« * I

CLIENT:

NEAREST RELATIVE:

\<&uUJ

\4c^J^^J>

A»

*

(for use in maintaining contac

K/AV U*

^ Q x^ARQ

This letter will set forth our agreement made on
A^A V
3* ^
/ v o *» concern
your representation by Robert B. Hansen in yourclaim against
(t*Qft€¥*T f^ 5 ^ ^ c
which arose out of f
^ C^tx^ G L ^ ^ < ^ 6 C ^ ^
on M M A 7 J4flf>
at
^ | o n gfl ^
flEb I A / B S Q
/£O*^>
You have hired me to represent you in the claim described above. I will attempt to
get a recovery by negotiating a settlement or by taking whatever legal action is deemed
necessary. I cannot promise that we will be successful or that you will receive any mone
If we are not successful, you will owe me nothing except expenses I have advanced. If we
are successful, you will payjne one-third (33 1/3 %) pf\any recovery received^FCAsc o «
I will advance all court costs necessary to pursue your claim, but you will have to
repay me for those expenses even if we lose and no recovery is received. If a recovery i
received, the expenses will be taken out of that recovery in addition to my fees.
You authorize me to: (1) receive the proceeds of any recovery; (2) retain my
percentage of the gross recovery; (3) deduct from the proceeds any expenses advanced
by me; (4) deliver the balance to you; (5) execute all documents necessary to settle
or close the case; and (6) settle any liens out of any recovery.
As long as you are available for consultation, I will not settle your claim without
first consulting with you and getting your approval. However, if you move or leave town,
you agree to leave a phone number or address where you can be reached. You authorize me
to settle your case on your behalf at whatever amount I deem advisable if I cannot locate
you for a period of thirty (30) days.
If you settle this claim without my consent, you will still have to pay me the same
percentage of the final recovery as described above.
I may terminate this agreement by giving 30 days written notice. If I terminate
this agreement, I will not be entitled to my percentage; but you will still have to pay
me for any expenses which I have advanced. If you terminate this agreement for any
reason other than my misconduct or inability to act, I shall be entitled to my full fee
as described above. You must also repay any expenses which I have advanced for your
case within 20 days after any termination.
It is agreed that I might bring in other }axtfers\iho
will assist on your case. In
that case, I will pay those lawyers out of my/fee. Thfere will be no cost to you.

Date:

^ W ^ "7. l4&
0

/ \^ZZJh ^^Uy^ROBERT B. HANSEN

I accept the fee arrangement set forth in this letter.

EXHIBIT •
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St* Lak» C*y. (tab 84106
(801) 486-0621

3038

ACCT. NO

RETAIL INSTALLMENT C O N T R A C T / S T U D E N T E N R O L L M E N T A G R E E M E N T
This contract and all attached sheets are one agreement and all the information, clauses and convenants in this contract are mcoroorated m
the attached sheets as though set out in full therein, however, if any clause disclosure or covenant m this contract shall differ or be in conflict
" with any and all attached sheet or sheets, this contract and its covenants shall govern.
The undersigned school, college or university, hereinafter known as Seller, hereby sells and the undersigned student hereinafter known as
Buvax, or yom hereby purchases, subject to the terms and conditions herein set out. the following coursets) and materials
.course(s) as described in tne schools catalog
Buyer's Name({Nlr)

(WTS)

K eu>

e*

•

(Please Pnnti
to be given at the following location.

,19.

starting

[At?

(TOS) OMlSS)

^ c ut o 0 C
LMC/'incw'D
*Ztr\

JL.«\'JVT

, Afternoon.

. . You understand that you shall attend the Morn ,
. Day.
.Eve.
^
*~7H t j
consecutive weeks/monthsiTotal number of hour*
/ / * - L > Total number of Semester/Quarter Units

Area
Pnone
session far ' *
AN N U A L n f e ^ ^ ^ 4 ?
PERCENTAGE RATEi-^Jf
p
TheTJoet*$f your credit as
yeatlyTate / ~ >;_

FINANCE CHARGER. The dollar amount the credit
will cost your**"?";^
*

YOUR PAYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE

L » b( ( r v

Amount of each payment

Number of payments

zz.

^ AMOUNT FINANCED
„ The amount of credit^
provided to you on your"
behalf.

r > ^ £ *** ^ f

TOTAL OF PAYMENTS
TheVmount you will have
paid after you have made
all payments as scheduled.

TOTAL SALES PRICE
The total cost of your purchase
on credit including your down
payment and/or registration lee

, /'/OZ.CV

ofS
S _

<'^ br6 °"/

When payments are due

* INCUJC£'
_t

>

if"

3, A-C
r

* *U/ft

~" ~

- _ y

Kl

Uut'f^

'

V'/7n

Monthly
Beginning.
. 19 <? W and on the same day of each month
weekly—z:
thereafter until paid in full
,~~
II Buy«f thouia n««d addition*) training *na/or txtend^flutming tn« BUVM «•>»! h* er^ ry« •< «r>» f t * at i ~ * . . A, par mmr/.««»fcjiww»th ^ > ,<//_

THE POLICY OF T H E SCHOOL IS: alfcuition and fees are due
and payable on first day of attendance.
*
IT
27

3.

Payments will be made at the office of the Seller or Seller's
assignee.
.,
In -event of default of Buyer in the payment of any installment if
such default shall continue for a period of 10 days, Seller may
collect a delinquency charge not exceeding 5% of such install'
ment or $5 00. whichever is less minimum S I 00 provided that
such delinquency charge may be collected not more than once
on any installment
If Buyer defaults in the performance of his/her obligation hereunder, including the making of any payment provided for herein
when due and payable, the Seller, at his/her option and without
notice to Buyer, may declare the whole amount unpaid hereunder
immediately due and oavable

4

In the event that the holder of this contract prevails in any action
to enforce the terms or provisions hereof, Buyer agrees to pay
reasonable attorney fees and actual court costs Buyer warrants
that all of the statements made in the Buyer's statement are true
and correct

5.

Buyer is entitled to pay in advance the remaining unpaid bal*
ance due hereunder and receive a pro rate refund of the FINANCE CHARGE computed in accordance with the actuarial

This contract embodies the who68«Heement between these parties,
and the Buyer agrees that no representation, warranty or guaranty
has been made to him/her which is not expressly set forth herein, and
that all the benefits hereof accruing to the Seller, shall also accrue to
Seller's assignee or any subsequent assignee No transfer, renewal,
extension or assignment of this contract shall release Buyer from
his/her obligation hereunder

"

ITEMIZATION OF THE AMOUNT FINANCED

1.

CASH PRICE

*

'

a.Tuition.:
*

.'.

-, /

, - , «.

as* ""

O.bOO

b. Registration Fee

s

c. Incidental F e e *

a A/fcA*

d. Supplies.:

T

*.'

/DC

e. Books
f
2.

*J~r«n*'Cr''
% Sales Tax

TOTAL CASH PRICE

3.

£

*jj*rft'flirf^

LESS DEDUCTIONS

s /

11

£^

~* CL

£~

C>J

a,Registration Fee

s

dOther

"'

,

_

S

JJ„

^ ~UZ}

4.

TOTAL DEDUCTIONS

S L s l l l L ^ L j

5.

UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE
(2less4)

^ />,..
& s VOjJ

6.

AMOUNT FINANCED

$ Q be

o-v

Uc~~

. The entire amount financed will be applied to your accounts.
~

Time is of the essence of this contract, and all terms and designations herein contained shall be deemed to have the numper, gender and entitiy
applicable to parties who execute this contract The term Seller shall be deemed to include any assignee or subseouent holder of this contract
If any part or provision hereof is contrary to the provisions of law in any state wherein this contract may be executed, the remaining provisions
shall be binding and effective nevertheless. .
NOTICE TO BUYER* (1) Do not sign this agreement before you read It or If It contains any blank spaces to be filled in. (2) You are
entitled to a completely filled-ln copy of this agreement (3) You can repay the full amount due underthis agreement at a n y t i m e and
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge if It is S1 or more Because of the way the amount of this refund will be figured, the time
when you prepay could Increase the ultimate cost of credit underthis a g r e e m e n t . (4) If you desire to pay off in advance the full amount
due, the amount of the refund you are entitle to, If any, will be furnished upon request. (5) This agreement is not binding until
accepted by Seller.
— . —
_ - _ -

Print Name

By signing below Buyer (Stuoent; acknowledges a receipt of a
complete and true copy of this Retail installment Contract and
agrees toalllhe terms and conditions including tnose se' «ortn on tne
reverse side
_
Buyer
' ^ y y
Date*
Sign Here

Address

Print N a m e _ i.
Address . 1 .ft~

I hereby guarantee payment o( all obligations of the Buyer (Stuoent)
hereunder to the Seller (School) or its assignee
^t^0*"^
„«r*^

Guarantor
Sign Here

Date

K€1

City"

. State.

•HtJme Tel I

. Work Tel (

.Zip.

Social Security No ,
Seller^

"£P""

(Aft

»' ^

Home Tel ( * £ > ! i V * b " . A 6 7

H

^'

State.

-1

Work T > I i

.Zip.
, _ ,

Social Security No . .

iTlQto^TQ/fJUi^Sf

Address
3ress_L

r.iwJA\

L*I

L.fc.LK^D

~QLOff£

By

rZ

. Title.

Date

City

NOTICE: See reverse side for additional t e r m s p i contract T \%
4MARMIMA

CO«

^ / ^ / ^ >
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AMERICAN CONCt. T INSURANCE COMPA', SY

ODSRSP

August 6, 1986

Kelly Howard
1065 Garnette
Salt Lake City, UT

84116

RE: Our Insured: Robert Buhler
Our File #: 15362
Date of Loss: 11/9/85

Dear Mr* Howard,
On July 8, 1986 we made a settlement with you for injuries sustained in the above
captioned incident contingent upon our receiving a copy of the school contract
for your computer training.
As of this date, the above mentioned information has not been received. If you
are still interested in settling your claim, please provide American Concept with
a copy of your education contract so that we may conclude this matter*
If you have any questions, please feel'free to contact the undersigned.

Sincerely,

Christine L. Kirchoff
Claims Representative
CLK:lkm
Enc.

f:
DEFENDANTS
I |
EXHIBIT

h ^

EXHIB'~
Centennial Souare • RQ Box 1720 • Raod Gtv. SO S7709 • <60S) 342-1776
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K N O W A i l MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the Undersigned, being of lawful age. for the sole consideration nf
1
1

Eight

thousand

and n o / 1 0 0
nnli*r S p f L 0 0 0 . 0 0

to the undersigned in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and for my/our/its heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge

Robert

Buhlei

and A m e r i c a n

Conrpflt

Insurance Company
and his. her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, firms, corporations,
associations or partnershios of and from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account
of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or

about the
9th
Lake City, Utah

rj*»y nf

November

t?85 , at or mmr 2100 South and Redwood Road. Salt

It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disDuted claim, and that the payment
made is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released, and that said releasees
deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace.
The undersigned hereby declare(s) and represent(s) that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive
and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this Release it is understood ot\6 agreed, that the undersigned rely(ies) wholly upon the undersigned's judgment, belief end knowledge of the neiurt, exTent, effect and duration of said
injuries and liability therefor end is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or poti'iez hereby
released or Ytyelr representatives orjgy any physician or surgeon by them employed.
The undersigned furtherypeclarejs) and represent(s) that there may be unknown or unanticipated injuries resulting from the above
stated accident, casualty or event and in making this Release it is understood and agreed that this Release is intended to include such
injuries.
The undersigned further declare(s) and represent(s) that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been
made to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, end that the terms
of this Release ere contractual and not a mere recital.
This Release expressly reserves all rights of the person, or persons, on whose behalf the payment is made and the rights of all
persons in privity or connected with them, end reserves to them their right to pursue their legal remedies, r? any, including but not
limited to claims for contribution, property damage and personal injury against the undersigned or those in privity or connected with
the undersigned.
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE F O R E G O I N G
Signed, sealed end delivered this.

RELEASE A N D FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.

-day of.

.. 19C A U T I O N : READ BEFORE S I G N I N G BELOW

f
•IS

Witness
Witness
-IS
Witness

EXHiB 1 J

STATE O F .
SS.
COUNTY O F .
On the

19.

jay ot.

., before me personally appeered.

to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and.
that

voluntarily executed the same.

My term expires

, 19
Notary Fubiic

Form No. L-3657-A

-ecknowledaec to me
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